Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 16
Issue 3 Summer 2009

Article 2

2009

Past Is Prologue: Recent Carbon Regulation Disputes in Europe
Shape the U.S. Carbon Future
Cameron Ferrey
Steven Ferrey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cameron Ferrey and Steven Ferrey, Past Is Prologue: Recent Carbon Regulation Disputes in Europe Shape
the U.S. Carbon Future , 16 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 650 (2009)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol16/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

PAST IS PROLOGUE: RECENT CARBON REGULATION
DISPUTES IN EUROPE SHAPE THE U.S. CARBON FUTURE

Cameron Ferrey and Steven Ferrey*
Copyright 2009

Cameron Ferrey is at Middlebury College and is founder and President of Computers
Across Borders ("CAB"). CAB is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit NGO based in the United States
that distributes computers to schools in developing countries that are using renewable
energy for powering their schools. During the past year, CAB has distributed computers
on three continents to hydroelectric-powered schools in Ecuador and Ghana, and windpowered schools in India. Steven Ferrey is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law
School and has been Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard University, and is the author of
six books. He has served for the past fifteen years as a legal advisor to the World Bank
and United Nations in developing countries.

MISSOURI

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND

POLICY REVIEW
A publication by the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law and the Missouri Bar

VOLUME

16

SUMMER

2009

NUMBER

3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
ERIN P. SEELE
MANAGING EDITOR
MICHAEL C. RISBERG
ASSOCIATE MANAGING EDITORS
MATT ARENS
ABBIE HESSE ROTHERMICH
KEVIN DOTHAGER

ASSOCIATE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
NICOLE HUTSON
LEAD ARTICLES EDITOR
ROBERT A. NOCE

NOTE AND COMMENT EDITORS
CALEB COLBERT
RACHEL RILEY
CHELSEA R. MITCHELL

JOHNATHAN R. AUSTIN
CHINEMEREM U. CHUKWU
KATHERINE M. DOLL
TERRY L. GARNER
DANIELLE HOFMAN
MARY CILE GLOVER-ROGER

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
KAMERON M. LAWSON
MARTHA D. LEVERENZ
JESSICA M. LONG
MICHAEL A. MOOREFIELD
DANIEL S. RICH

JESSICA ADAMS
CARA M. LUCKEY
AARON SANDERS
THOMAS C. SMITH
KATIE Jo WHEELER

FACULTY ADVISOR
PROFESSOR THOM A. LAMBERT

ROBERT BRUNDAGE

BOARD OF ADVISORS
STEPHEN JEFFERY

STEPHEN KRCHMA

EDITOR'S PERSPECTIVE
With the December debate looming concerning the continuation of
the Kyoto Protocol taking place in Copenhagen, our article, Past is
Prologue: Recent Carbon Regulation Disputes in Europe Shape the U.S.
Carbon Future, written by Cameron Ferrey and Steven Ferrey, is a very
thoughtful and timely piece. After explaining some of the similarities
between the European Union and the United States, the authors explore
the Kyoto Protocol and the cap-and-trade mechanism, which world
economies use to regulate carbon. By demonstrating the stakeholders'
disputes in both the European Union and the United States, the authors
predict that "past is prologue" and some of the same struggles and disputes
that occurred in the European Union are going to occur in the United
States as it tries to regulate carbon.
The first case note, written by Kevin Dothager, examines a
Western District of North Carolina decision which holds that certain plants
within 100 miles of the North Carolina border contributed enough
pollution to be considered a public nuisance. In its holding, the court
orders an injunction to force the Tennessee Valley Authority to install
available pollution control measures. Based on Missouri nuisance law,
Kevin argues that Missouri, ranking ninth in the use of coal produced
power plants, could be susceptible to public nuisance claims from a
neighboring state and examines what costs could be passed onto Missouri
households if such claims were brought.
Michael C. Risberg authored the next case note, which explores a
Sixth Circuit's holding that the EPA's rule, that pesticides applied in
accordance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
are exempt from the Clean Water Act's permitting requirements, was
improper. After examining the reasoning and soundness of the court's
decision, Michael argues that placing more stringent requirements on
biological pesticides than chemical pesticides would be inconsistent with
the goals of the Clean Water Act, and that the court's holding could
negatively affect the environment and could invalidate the parts of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System's general permitting
process that makes it a preferable alternative to individual permits.

The third case note, written by Erin P. Seele, examines the Western
District of Missouri's decision which holds the City of St. Louis and the
City of St. Louis Airport Authority responsible for ninety-nine violations
of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System by demolishing
buildings still containing asbestos. In its holding, the court affirms the
EPA's long-standing, but never binding, opinion that a group of four or
more single-family residences owned or controlled by the same operator
are subject to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Erin
examines this holding and the court's new standard to overcome summary
judgment under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's imminent
and substantial endangerment claim and its possible environmental
impacts.
Brian Schierding authored the final case note which explores the
United States Supreme Court decision in Winter v. NRDC. In deciding
that the interest of having sonar-trained naval personnel far outweighed
the potential environmental impacts on marine mammals, the Court held
that the test for a preliminary injunction should be whether irreparable
harm was likely and that the four factors for a preliminary injunction
should now be examined together. Brian examines the Court's holding,
which rules in favor of the Navy, and argues that the new standard for
preliminary injunctions makes it easier for the military to succeed in these
types of cases and hurts advocates who are trying to protect the
environment from the United States military.
This edition ends with seven updates on recently decided
environmental cases from courts around the country.
I want to acknowledge the hours spent perfecting the footnotes by
Michael C. Risberg, the Managing Editor, as well as Kevin Dothager,
Matt Arens, and Abbie Hesse Rothermich, the Associate Managing
Editors. Robert A. Noce, the Lead Articles Editor, deserves recognition
for not only diligently and thoughtfully reviewing article submissions
throughout the summer but also helping to check footnotes. I would also
like to recognize the Note and Comment Editors, Rachel Riley and Caleb
Colbert, who helped grade this year's write-on competition, and Chelsea
R. Mitchell, who provided many thoughtful editorial comments to this
edition's case notes. Nicole Huston, the Associate Editor-In-Chief,

deserves recognition for helping over-see the write on competition,
helping edit the edition, and ensuring that everything runs smoothly. I
would like to welcome our new associates who will no doubt help improve
and ensure the success of this journal. Finally, Dean Lambert deserves
thanks for serving as our faculty advisor.
Erin P. Seele
Editor-In-Chief
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ABSTRACT

With looming and necessary regulation of carbon emissions and
global warming, past is prologue. The significant, and often obscured,
conflicts that recently erupted in the European Union (hereinafter "EU')
to regulate carbon pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, forecasts similar
looming conflicts among US stakeholders as the U.S. attempts to
implement carbon regulation. These conflicts inside the EU, andprologue
for the upcoming U.S. development of carbonprotocol,fall into a handful
of categories:

Conflict over the auction of CO2 emission rights instead of
continued allocation of emission rights without charge to
traditionalemitters. Carbon regulationrepresents the first time in
world history that a significant quantity of emission rights have
been auctioned, and will skew significantly the regulatory and
economic costs ofproduction in affected industries.
Less developed states are resisting moderately aggressive carbon
regulation, asking more developed states to bear more of the
carbon reductions.
States more dependent on coal-fired electric generation are more
resistant to CO 2 regulation. This regulation will impose
significantly higher costs on areas utilizing traditionalcoal-fired
power.
Emerging changes for centralized control over carbon emissions,
superceding individual state control over carbon emission credit
amounts and allocations to local industry. While an international
problem, even the Kyoto Protocol has no enforcement mechanism
should a country not meet its reductions.
The speed of implementation of carbon reductions is now being
questioned, especially in a time of economic recession. That
recession, alone, tends to lower economic activity and carbon
emissions, and strains resources to absorb the costs of additional
carbon control.
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PAST IS PROLOGUE
This article makes an internationalcomparison of the nature of the
European carbon dispute and how it signals similarproblems in the U.S.
context. There is close parallelbetween the mushrooming and unresolved
carbon conflict among countries in the EU, compared to looming battles
over U.S. carbon regulation. Past is prologue. It is not surprisingthat
similar differences among both the European and U.S. states' degree of
development, regional reliance on high-carbon coal resources, recourse
to carbon auction as a revenue source, and defense of states' rights as
opposed to a centralized multi-state solution, are creating parallel
frictionsas the U.S. develops a climate change policy.
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PAST IS PROLOGUE
PAST IS PROLOGUE: RECENT CARBON REGULATION
DISPUTES IN EUROPE SHAPE THE U.S. CARBON FUTURE
I.

INTRODUCTION: WHERE PAST IS PROLOGUE

"What is past is prologue."' An increasingly contentious European
experience trying to control carbon emissions is prologue for the imminent
U.S. entry into carbon control. There are significant similarities between
the EU countries and the U.S. states:
There are forty-four European countries and fifty U.S. states, each
group producing a relatively equal percentage of world gross
domestic product.
The EU contains 500 million people and has 750 gigawatts
(hereinafter "GW") of power generating capacity, while the U.S.
has 325 million people with about 950 GW of power generating
capacity.
The basic electric power technologies and extent of service are
similar, with only small differences in power prime movers and
technologies.
Twenty-seven EU countries and twenty-three U.S. states are
regulating carbon.
The amount of CO 2 emissions in the EU has increased about one
percent annually, instead of shrinking,2 parallel to that of the U.S.
The contention in the EU over the form and scope of carbon
regulation has closely tracked whether to auction CO 2 emission
allowances, degree of regional dependence on coal-fired power,
accommodation of hesitant late entrants to the carbon regime, centralized
control by a larger authority, and speed of reduction of carbon. These are
issues involving technology and political governance foreshadowing the

' WLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1.

2 Leila Abboud,

EU Greenhouse-GasEmissions Rose 1.1% Last Year; Cap and trade
Wins on Market, but Problem Grows, WALL ST. J., April 3, 2008, at A9.
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U.S. debate on carbon. In the EU, clear policy lines have formed between
the original EU-15 countries, and the later-joining former Eastern Block
entrants. The dissenters have enough votes to block consensus. Similarly,
in the U.S., twenty-three states have embarked on carbon regulation, with
the other half of the states choosing not to join the voluntary carbon
schemes.
This article tracks both these recent EU disputes, and the
beginnings of similar issues emerging in the U.S. debate. There is no time
for an endless debate: amid need for immediate effective action, the world
may be approaching a "tipping point" in less than a decade, where,
without dramatic reduction of emission of greenhouse gases (hereinafter
"GHGs"), the chance to implement successful global warming policy
declines precipitously.3 These debates must be successfully resolved on
both sides of the Atlantic for world carbon regulation, and Kyoto, to
succeed.
Cap-and-trade is the regulatory mechanism with which world
economies have decided to regulate carbon emissions. Cap-and-trade is
the establishment of emission limits on certain sources, allocation of the
legal rights to emit, and the ability of entities to trade for more or less
quantity of such allowances. New U.S. Energy Secretary, Steven Chu, has
announced that he and President Obama support a simple cap-and-trade
system for the U.S., which would "integrate" with the systems in the EU.4
The European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System
(hereinafter "EU-ETS") carbon regulation was implemented effective
2005 as a parallel CO 2 regulatory system with an earlier start for the now
twenty-seven EU-member countries and three other participating
European countries (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) that also are

3 James Hansen et al., TargetAtmospheric C0 : Where Should Humanity Aim?,
2 OPEN
2
ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 225-26, availableat http://www.benthamopen.org/pages/content.php?TOASCJ/2008/00000002/ 00000001/217TOASCJ.SGM;
Bill McKibben, Civilization'sLast Chance: The Planetis Nearinga Tipping Point on
Climate Change, and It Gets Much Worse Fast,L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2008, available
at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-op-mckibben I l2008mayl 1,0,2392815.story.
4New DOE Secretary Backs Cap-and-Trade,CARBON CONTROL NEws, Jan. 13, 2009.
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covered by the Kyoto Protocol.5 The EU is the only region of the world
yet to have implemented a cap-and-trade system for GHGs.6 However,
twenty-three U.S. states joined by four Canadian provinces, under four
different regulato 7 regimes, are also moving forward on cap-and-trade
carbon regulation. The Obama administration and Energy Secretary Chu
have also endorsed a cap-and-trade carbon scheme. 8
The EU-ETS covers CO 2 emissions at approximately 5,000
companies at 12,000 industrial sites, unlike the Kyoto Protocol which
covers all GHGs. 9 The EU-ETS utilizes National Allocation Plans for the
(free) distribution of carbon emission allowances.' 0 The quantity of
allowances a nation can issue is governed by eleven EU-ETS criteria, but
otherwise national discretion is not explicitly proscribed by the EU." In
its second allocation round for national allowances to emit C0 2 , the
European Commission plans to centrally determine future national

The EU-ETS entered into force on 25 October 2003. Council Directive 2003/87,
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the
Community and Amending Council Directive 9/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC)
[hereinafter Council Directive 2003/87], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0046:EN:PDF.
6 FRANK CONVERY ET AL., MIT GLOBAL CHANGE SCIENCE POLICY, REPORT NO. 162,
5

THE
EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD 19

(2008), available at
http://globalchange.mit.edulfiles/document/MITJPSPGCRptl62.pdf.
7 See discussion infra Part II.b-d.
8
New DOE Secretary Backs Cap-and-Trade, supra note 4.
9 Compare Our climate in EU - EU ETS,
http://www.ourclimate.eu/ourclimate/ourclimate/euets.aspx (last visited July 11, 2009),
with Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3, Dec. 11 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
1o Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 5, arts. 9-11.
1 See id. annex 11; Communication from the Commission on Guidance to Assist Member
States in the Implementation of the Criteria Listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance trading Within the
Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, and on the Circumstances Under
Which Force Majeure is Demonstrated, COM (2003) 830 final (Jan. 7, 2004), available
at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0830:FIN:en:PDF.

656

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 3

allowances.12 Similarly, in the four U.S. systems of carbon regulation
governing twenty-three states, ten states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (hereinafter "RGGI") regulate only C0 2 , while other states
indicate willingness to regulate a wider spectrum of GHGs.13
Despite the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, about
half of the U.S. states are individually or collectively enacting carbon
regulation that is not dissimilar to the Kyoto Protocol. The states are
attempting to combine to act in groups of six to ten states, which
collectively make each such state group more significant in terms of
carbon emissions than many of the thirty-nine major Annex I developed
countries regulated under the Kyoto Protocol.
The RGGI program involves ten Northeastern states, commencing
in 2009 as the first CO 2 regulation in the U.S.14 CO 2 emissions from large
power plants in the region will be capped at current levels until 2015,
thereafter incrementally reducing emissions by a cumulative ten percent
by 2019.1s California, alone, is the twelfth largest GHG producer in the
world.' 6 California is larger in its carbon emissions than two-thirds of the
regulated Annex I developed nations under the Kyoto Protocol.
California's landmark state legislation establishes a comprehensive capand-trade program, to commence in 2012, to reduce its aggregate GHG
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. This equates to an eventual estimated
twenty-five to twenty-nine reduction from business-as-usual levels.' 7 The
12CONVERY ET AL., supra note 6, at
10.
13See

discussion infra Part II.b-d.
14Reg'1 Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding (Dec.
20, 2005)
[hereinafter RGGI MOU], available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/moufinal 12 20_05.pdf.
1 Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on Proposed
Rules for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program to Address Climate Change 2 (Aug.
15, 2006), availableat http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-rulerelease8_15_06.pdf.
1 MICHAEL PEEVEY, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N & CAL. PUBIC UTIL. COMM'N, PROPOSED
FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 (2008).
" CAL. ENERGY COMM'N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, PROPOSED FINAL OPINION

SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 1 (2008), available at

http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-100-2008-004/CEC-100-2008004.PDF; M.J. Bradley & Associates, LLC, Climate Change Briefing: California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, http://www.mjbradley.com/briefingspecialab32.html
(last visited July 12, 2009).
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RGGI in ten Eastern states, but not California, immediately auctions,
rather than freely allocates, cap-and-trade allowances.
There are two regional carbon cap-and-trade initiatives in the U.S.,
each involving multiple states and Canadian provinces. The Western
Climate Initiative (hereinafter "WCI") includes seven very different U.S.
states in terms of their energy resource usage including the West coast
states, Arizona, New Mexico, Montana and Utah, as well as five provinces
of Canada,' 8 with a regional, economy-wide goal to reduce GHG
emissions to fifteen percent below the 2005 levels by 2020. The seven
WCI states represent more than twenty percent of the U.S. economy, and
the four associated Canadian provinces represent seventy percent of the
Canadian economy. WCI will start with a minimum ten percent allowance
auction in 2012, ramping up to a minimum twenty-five percent auction by
2020. In the center of the nation, six Midwestern states and one Canadian
province executed a regional GHG cap-and-trade emission reduction
strategy.19
II. COMPARATIVE CAP-AND-TRADE CARBONISM

A. The Legal Construct of the Kyoto Protocol
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter
"UNFCCC") treaty was agreed to at the Rio de Janeiro U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development in 1992 and the Kyoto convention in

18 See Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited
Aug. 2, 2009). The states of Alaska, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho and Nevada,
the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, and six Mexican states, Baja
California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas will participate in
WCI as observers. Id.
19See Midwestern Governor's Ass'n, Midwestern Energy Sec. & Climate Stewardship
Summit, Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord (Nov. 15, 2007), availableat
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/Publications/Greenhouse%20gas%20accordLayo
ut%201.pdf.
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1997.20
In the Rio Declaration, the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibility" was articulated 2 1 and the UNFCCC created
the conference of the parties, 22 a multinational working group, to
administer the carbon mitigation scheme. The Rio Declaration was signed
by 154 countries.2 3 The "Kyoto Protocol" received subsequent national
adoption by fifty-five percent of Annex I (developed country) party
signatories by February 2005, which achieved the minimum required
ratification by nations and then entered into effect. 24 In recent
contemporaneous rounds of discussion, more than 180 countries attended
the Bali Conference in 2007. More than 175 of these nations had by 2007
previously ratified the Protocol to take effect in 2008, although most were
not subjected to any requirements thereunder. 25
The Kyoto Protocol, not ratified prominently by the U.S. and for a
time, Australia, requires those thirty-eight developed nations by 2012 to
reduce CO 2 emissions to an average of six percent below the 1990

20

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
21 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon EnvironmentandDevelopment, princ. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12 1992), availableat
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/aconfl 5126- lannex l.htm.
22 UNFCCC, supra note 20, art.
7.
23 United Nations Division for Sustainable
Development - Agenda 21,
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/ documents/agenda2 1/index.htm (last visited June 1,
2009).
24 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Status of Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/ kyoto-protocol/statusofratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct.
19, 2008). Russia's adoption of the treaty provided the required number of countries for

the treaty to having binding effect. See generally Steven Lee Myers, Russia 's Lower
House Approves Kyoto Treaty on Emissions,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A2, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/23/intemational/europe/23kyoto.html (reporting
effects of Russian adoption).
25
PETER D. CAMERON, History of Climate Change andPolicy, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A
GUIDE TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE 23, 35 (Paul Q. Watchman ed., 2008); see
generally The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali,
http://unfecc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited June 1, 2009).
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baseline levels.2 6 The other GHGs must be reduced to between five to
seven percent below either the 1990 or 1995 baseline levels effective by
2008 to 2012. 27 Developing nations successfully resisted efforts to
include their emissions in binding international obligations and opposed
encouraging its voluntary commitments to GHG reduction.28 Kyoto
reflects "common but differentiated" responsibilities between developed
and developing countries.29 The largest CO 2 emitter in the world, China,
is not covered as an Annex I covered country.30 Under Kyoto, there is no
responsibility assigned to developing countries.31

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, annex B. The Kyoto Protocol received subsequent
national adoption by fifty-five parties to the Convention, notably excluding the U.S., by
February 2005 and then entered into effect. Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/statusof ratification/application/pdf/kpratificatio
n_20090708.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2009). While most countries have committed to
achieve an eight percent reduction below 1990 levels for C0 2, see Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 9, annex B, there has been a reallocation among European Union countries so that
some countries are allowed to emit more than these baseline levels while others are
required to reduce up to twenty-eight percent, with the weighted average for the
European Union overall being eight percent reduction. See infra text accompanying
notes 32-33; see also Kyoto Protocol, supranote 9, art. 4(1) (granting the EU the
authority to devise an agreement among member states to jointly meet the EU's
collective commitment).
27 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3(7)-(8). For six GHGs that are suspected of causing
global warming, principally including CO 2 and methane (CH 4), major developed
countries have targets for the reduction of these GHGs during the period 2008-2012. Id.
art. 3(1), annex A. One hundred eighty-six countries and one regional economic
integration organization have ratified the Protocol. Kyoto Protocol: Status of
Ratification, supra note 26.
28 Paul G. Harris, Common but DiferentiatedResponsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and
United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 27, 33-34 (1999).
29 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 10 ("All Parties, taking into account their common
26

but differentiated responsibilities . . . ."). The concept was originally part of the Montreal

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 5, 10, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol] (amended by
the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, June 29, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-9, 30 I.L.M. 537).
30
See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 9, annex B (providing Annex I countries); List of NonAnnex I Parties to the Convention,
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The Kyoto Protocol is a cap-and-trade regulatory construct. Each
of the thirty-eight developed nations is allocated a national emissions cap,
which applies to certain large industrial emitters of carbon within the
country. At the end of each compliance period (year), each emitter must
have acquired enough credits to cover its emissions of carbon during that
period, either through allocation from its governments or by acquiring,
through purchase or trade, additional allocation credits. In essence, each
emitter must cover its emissions with regulatory allowances or newly
created offset credits to emit carbon.
The participating regulated Annex I EU countries made significant
political differentiation among its responsibilities to reduce carbon
emissions ranging from a twenty-eight percent carbon reduction
(Luxembourg) to an allowed twenty-seven percent carbon increase
(Portugal).3 2 Australia is allowed to increase emissions up to eight
percent, while Russia, Ukraine, and New Zealand have no reduction
requirements. 33
Annex I regulated countries must set up national registries to issue
its internationally assigned amount units (hereinafter "AAUs"). 34 Registry
removal units (hereinafter "RMUs"), reflecting removal of GHGs due to
forestry and land-use practices, also are tracked.3 5 Each AAU and RMU is

http://unfccc.int/parties andobservers/parties/nonannex_ilitems/2833.php (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008) (including China in Non-Annex I parties to Kyoto).
31 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, passim.
32 ANTHONY HOBLEY, Creatinga Global Carbon Market, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE
TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supranote 25, at 127, 129.
33
Id. at 129.
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties,
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the parties on
its Seventh Session-PartTwo: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties(Volume
II), dec. 19/CP.7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Marrakesh Accords].
3s See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol-PartTwo: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Partiesat its FirstSession, dec. 13/CMP. 1, annex, paras.
25, 32, U.N. doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 1 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP1 Report-Part Two], availableat
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tracked with a unique serial number.36 AAUs and RMUs are converted
into Emission Reduction Units (hereinafter "ERUs") for international
trading purposes. 37 Emission trading is allowed under the Kyoto
Protocol.3 8 Therefore, any party can purchase EU credits, even if they do
not require them for compliance. This includes those traders who wish to
speculate in these regulatory commodities.
Despite Kyoto and its binding requirements on EU countries,
European GHG emissions in industrialized European countries are
increasing. 39 All EU countries are forecasted to miss their Kyoto targets,
with the exception of two former Soviet countries. 40 Among the
developed countries covered by the Kyoto Protocol, only Russia and
Poland are expected to satisfy their 2010 targets, and this is because of the
economic collapse in those countries that shattered many existing CO 2
emission sources. 4 1
Most excess allocated emission allowances are held by Russia and
Ukraine.4 2 These are expected to be in excess of 791.5 million metric tons
of CO 2 equivalent per year by 2010.43 These excess emission allowances
are approximately thirty-three percent of validated Clean Development
Mechanism (hereinafter "CDM") emissions reductions as of May 1, 2007,
and almost one-half the number of Certified Emission Reductions

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmpl/eng/08a02.pdf.
36 Marrakesh Accords, supranote 34, dec. 19/CP.7, annex, paras.
24, 27.
" COP/MOP-I Report-Part Two, supra note 35, dec. 12/CMP.1, annex, para. 29.
38 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 17; Marrakesh Accords, supra note 34, dec. 18/CP.7.
3 Press Release, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2006 UNFCCC
Greenhouse Gas Data Report Points to Rising Emission Trends (Oct. 30, 2006) (showing
an eleven percent increase in GHG emissions from 1990-2004, excluding economies in
transition in eastern and central Europe), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/newsroom/press releasesandadvisories/application/pdf/20
061027 ghg pressrelease_final english.pdf.
40 Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture andStorage Under the Sea,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2006, at 22.
41 id.
42 Craig A. Hart, The Clean Development Mechanism: Considerationsfor Investors and
Policymakers, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 41, 44 (2007).
43 Id.

662

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 3
(hereinafter "CERs")44 expected to be issued assuming a validation
estimate error of twenty-seven percent. 4 5 Aside from EU countries,
Canada and Japan are projected to miss their interim 2010 targets by 500
million tons of CO 2.46 Japan's emissions are rising and Canada has backed
away from its target obligations.4 7
Kyoto includes the creations of CDM "offsets," called CERs.4 8
Including offsets in a cap-and-trade system, offers several advantages:
It allows lower-cost reduction opportunities outside the capped
countries to be pursued as lower-cost reduction options;
Economic sectors that are covered by the carbon emissions
caps can be the source for reductions. This can include
emission sources not otherwise cost-effectively addressed; and
It can promote technology transfer to developing countries.
Industrial emitters in each country are able to trade emission
credits or create new credits through mechanisms to possess additional
credits. The CDM allows projects that reduce greenhouses gases in
developing nations to earn CERs for each ton of C02-equivalent of GHG
reduced. 49 Those CERs are then traded or sold to activities in Annex I
developed countries which increases those countries' emission cap
allocated in the Protocol.50 All emissions reduction CERs certified under

"4See infra text accompanying notes 48-55.
45 Hart, supra note 42, at 45.
46 See Jeffrey Ball, Kyoto's Caps on EmissionsHit Snag in Marketplace,

WALL ST. J.,

Dec. 3, 2007, at A-1 tbl., availableat
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB19664561728211237.html.
47

d

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 12(3).
49
Id. art. 12(3)(a); Marrakesh Accords, supra note 34, dec. 17/CP.7, annex, para. 1(b).
5o Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 12(3)(b). Credits earned after 2000 can be used to
achieve compliance during first commitment period, which begins in 2008. Id. art.
12(10). Two and one half percent of ERUs and CERs may be carried over to the second
phase of implementation after 2012. Marrakesh Accords, supra note 34, dec. 19/CP.7,
annex, para. 15(a)-(b).
48
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the CDM are required by the Protocol to be voluntary, real, and additional
to any that would occur in the absence of the CDM credit system.5 1
The CDM apparatus emerged as a last-minute compromise
creation at the 1997 Kyoto Conference. 52 It is patterned on the U.S. sulfur
dioxide (SO2 ) trading experience under the Clean Air Act amendments of
1990.53
The use of offsets for compliance creates extraterritorial
international compliance options to meet in-country Kyoto requirements;
by increasing supply of options and credits, offsets decrease total costs of
compliance by an estimated seventy-one percent. 54 CERs (other than for
afforestation) have a seven-year lifetime, with the possibility of two
renewals, for a total of twenty-one years, or in the alternative one ten-year
lifetime.
A second mechanism for compliance is Joint Implementation
(hereinafter "JP'), where developed nation signatory parties can implement
projects domestically or in other Annex I nations that remove GHGs or
create additional carbon sinks, which are then J uantified in an ERU.5 6 JI
projects are undertaken by Annex I countries. An ERU transfers a unit
of allowed carbon emissions from a selling country's cap to the purchasing
country. Unlike a CDM CER, which creates an additional emission unit
added to the cap, a JI project transfers a credit under the existing cap from
one nation to another nation, as a zero-sum transaction.
However, JI

52
5

54

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 12(5)(a)-(c).
CAMERON, supra note 25, at 31.
HOBLEY, supra note 32, at 132-133.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CARBON OFFSETS: THE U.S. VOLUNTARY

MARKET IS GROWING, BUT QUALITY ASSURANCES POSES CHALLENGES FOR MARKET

PARTICIPANTS 33 (2008).
ss Clean Dev. Mechanism Executive Bd., Glossary of CDM Terms (Version 04), at 14,
U.N. Doc. CDM-Glos-04 (Aug. 2, 2008), availableat
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/glosCDMv04.pdf).
56 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(1); Joint Implementation,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ mechanisms/joint implementation/items/1674.php (last
visited July 11, 2009).
5 COP/MOP-I Report-Part Two, supra note 35, dec. 9/CMP.1, annex, para 21.
58 Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(1)(d) with id. art. 12(5)(c). Whereas the
CDM process creates additional room in the envelope of permissible carbon emissions by
developed nations, the Joint Implementation process transfers a static quantity of existing
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projects have less burdensome transaction costs than CDM projects, as the
former are approved and administered by the parties involved rather than
the U.N. Kyoto Executive Board and JI projects are not subject to detailed
periodic monitoring.5 9
CDM projects may only be pursued by Annex I countries. 60 Since
the end of 2006, the World Bank reports that sixty-one percent of CDM
projects were located in China, twelve percent in India, seven percent in
other Asian countries, ten percent in Latin America (most significantly
Brazil), and three percent in Africa.6 1 Africa was largely left out of CDM
projects.
CDM CERs and JI ERUs are required to be "additional" to
baseline project emissions. 62 This involves the establishment of an
individual emissions baseline, taking account of sector reform initiatives,
barriers to expansion, and sector expansion plans. 63 Environmental groups
have questioned the "additionality" of renewable energy projects, if its
construction is not because of the value of the offset sale.6
Thus, the emission cap of any country includes assigned Kyoto
credit units plus RMUs from forestation projects that remove CO 2 from
the atmosphere, plus JI ERUs and CDM CERs. The Kyoto Protocol
collects thirty-eight developed nations into a voluntary agreement to limit
carbon emissions. Each of these nations decides how to impose these
limitations on its local industries. Those covered emitters of carbon
needing additional allowances can either create or purchase additional
allocated credits under the cap from one developed nation to another. Thus, the emission
cap of any country includes assigned Kyoto credit units plus removal units (RMUs) from
forestation projects that remove CO 2 from the atmosphere, plus JI ERUs and CDM
CERs.
59
JOHN MCMORRIS, Running a Carbon Project,in CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO
CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 25, at 57.
60 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 12; Marrakesh Accords, supra note 34, dec.
17/CP.7.
61 Lauren Etter, In China,a Plan to Turn Rice into Carbon
Credits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2007, at Al tbl., availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119187524509952568email.html.
62 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, arts.
6(l)(b), 12(5)(c).
63 Marrakesh Accords, supra note 34,
dec. 17/CP.7, annex, para. 45(e).
6 EnvironmentalistsSplit Over Support of Offsets for Plant Closures, CARBON CONTROL
NEws, Aug. 25, 2008, at 1.
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allowances through these two mechanisms. Both Kyoto Annex I countries
and U.S. private markets have risen with trading platforms for the trading
of offsets. 65 Selling carbon emission credits is typically done through
forward contracts. 66
B. The East Coast Ten State Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
To fill the vacuum left by the U.S.' decision not to participate in
the first two phases of the Kyoto Protocol, many states have taken its own
direct regulatory action.6 7 RGGI is the first effort in the U.S., and includes
twenty percent of all U.S. states. Beginning in April 2003, Governor
George Pataki of New York initiated the effort by inviting neighboring
states to participate in a regional cap-and-trade emissions program. 68 On
December 20, 2005, seven states, including Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont entered
Since that time,
into an agreement to implement the RGGI.69
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Rhode Island have agreed to sign the RGGI
Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter "MOU") (collectively all ten
states, the "RGGI states"). 70 The principle goal of the MOU is for RGGI
states to:
See, e.g., European Energy Exchange: EEX Startseite, www.eex.de, (last visited Sept.
6, 2009); Welcome to the European Climate Exchange - Home, www.europeanclimate
exchange.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2009); Portal - NordPool, www.nordpool.com (last
visited Sept. 6, 2009).
66 CHRISTOPHER NORTON, Selling Carbon Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO
CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 25, at 71.
67 For example, prior to joining any formal agreement, Massachusetts had enacted its own
regulations to reduce CO 2 emissions by ten percent below 1997-1999 levels. See 310
MASS. CODE REGS. 7.29 (2008).
68 Seven NortheastStates Launch Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ENV'T NEWS
Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2005/2005-12-20-05.asp.
SERV.,
69
RGGI MOU, supranote 14.
70 In January 2007, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which were originally given the
status of observing states, both agreed to formally join RGGI as signatory states. Press
Release, State of Mass., Governor Patrick Signs Regional Pact to Reduce Greenhouse
Gas Emissions (Jan. 18, 2007), availableat
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=pressreleases&agId=Agov3&prModName=gov3pressrele
65
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commit to propose for legislative and/or regulatory
approval a CO 2 Budget Trading Program (the "Program")
aimed at stabilizing and then reducing CO 2 emissions
within the Signatory States, and implementing a regional
CO 2 emissions budget and allowance trading program that
will regulate CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired electricity
generating units having a rated capacity equal to or greater
than 25 megawatts. 7 1
The market-based design of the RGGI MOU is a cap-and-trade program.
"Cap-and-trade systems operate by capping the amount of [C0 2 ] emissions
allowed, distributing [CO 2 ] emissions allowances to sources up to the cap,
and requiring each covered source to have sufficient allowances to cover
its [CO 2 ] emissions at the end of each compliance period."7 2 "CO2
emission allowances will be allocated to, and traded among, fossil fuelfired electricity generators within the region that supply electricity to the
grid.0 3
The RGGI Staff Working Group (hereinafter "SWG") finalized the
Draft Model Rule (hereinafter "Model Rule") in December of 2008.74 The
Model Rule is a product of over two years 75 of work by the SWG and is
the foundation upon which the RGGI states will base its individual
ase&prFile=reducegreenhouse gasesO 11807.xml; Cf Press Release, State of R.I.,
Statement Lt. Gov. Roberts Calls for Rhode Island to Join Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (January 23, 2007), availableat http://www.ri.gov/press/view.php?id=3423.
Maryland, a predominantly coal-powered electricity generating state, in contrast to the
other RGGI states, also subsequently joined RGGI in 2006. Press Release, State of Md.,
Governor Martin O'Malley Signs Greenhouse Gas Agreement, Climate Change
Executive Order (April 20, 2007), availableat
http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/070420.html. .
71 RGGI MOU, supranote
14, at 2.
72 Edna Sussman, New York Addresses Climate Change with
FirstMandatory U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Program,N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2006, at 43, 44.
7 Heddy Bolster, The Commerce Clause Meets EnvironmentalProtection: The
Compensatory Tax Doctrine as a Defense ofPotentialRegional CarbonDioxide
Regulation,47 B.C. L. REV. 737, 744 (2006) (citing RGGI MOU, supra note 14, at 2).
74
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) CO 2 Budget Trading Program - Model
Rule, http://www.rggi.org/about/history/model rule (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).
7s See id.
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regulatory rules. The Model Rule is used by each state as a starting point
for obtaining regulatory or legislative approval of its cap-and-trade
program, but all such authorization is accomplished at the individual state
levels.
RGGI CO 2 emissions from power plants in the region will be
capped at current levels and the cap will remain in place until 2015.76
RGGI states would then begin the process of incrementally reducing
emissions, with the goal of achieving a ten percent reduction by 2019.7
By 2020, the program is expected to reach an emissions reduction of
approximately thirty-five percent from a business-as-usual unregulated
carbon scenario.7 8
One significant aspect of the Model Rule is its requirement that
each state reserve a minimum of twenty-five percent of that state's
allowances for "consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose[s]." 7 9 This
translates to using the proceeds from wholesale auction of allowances.
Consumer benefits could range from using the money to actually
supplement consumer electricity bills or funding state-run energy
efficiency programs, to refunding amounts to consumers, to putting the
money back into the state coffers. Generators can then sell any excess
allowances or purchase additional allowances from other qualifying power
producers.
C. CarbonRegulation in California
California is the twelfth largest GHG producer in the world.8 0
Imported electricity contributes more GHG emissions (fifty-two percent)
than electricity produced in California, even though seventy-eight percent

76

RGGI MOU, supranote 14, para. 2C. The regional base annual CO emissions cap
2
will be equal to 121 million short tons. Id. para. 2B.
n Press Release, Reg'1 Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 15, at 2.
78
id.
79
REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE § 5.3(a)-(b) (2008), availableat

http://www.rggi.org/
docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf.
80

CAL. ENERGY COMM'N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note
17, at 2.
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of electricity is produced in-state.81 California has taken the most
aggressive approach of all the states to curb emissions. Its landmark
legislation establishes a comprehensive program of regulatory and market
mechanisms with the goal of achieving cost-effective and quantifiable
GHG emissions reductions.
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (commonly
referred to as Assembly Bill 32 or AB 32) requires the state to reduce its
82
AB 32 charges the
aggregate GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.
California Air Resources Board (hereinafter "CARB") with the
responsibility for developing and implementing a plan to meet this
challenging emissions-reduction goal. In addition to charging CARB with
the responsibility of establishing by January 1, 2008 a statewide GHG
emissions cap for implementation in 2020, based on 1990 emissions
levels, AB 32 further requires CARB to:
Adopt a plan by January 1, 2009, for achieving emissions
reductions from significant GHG sources via regulations, market
mechanisms and other actions;
Adopt rules and regulations by January 1, 2011, to achieve the
maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective GHG
reductions, including provisions for using both market
mechanisms and alternative compliance mechanisms; and
Evaluate several factors-prior to imposing mandates or
implementing market mechanisms-including but not limited to:
impacts on California's economy, the environment, and public
health; equity between regulated entities; electricity reliability,

81Id. at 2 fig. 1, 3. The percentage of imported electricity GHGs compared to in-state

electricity has ranged from thirty-nine to fifty-seven percent recently. Id. at 3.
82 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 38550 (West 2007). The California Assembly passed

Assembly Bill 32, signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on September 27, 2006.
Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark
Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/4111/.
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conformance with other environmental laws, and whether the
rules will disproportionately impact low-income communities. 83
AB 32 specifically recognizes that a market-based system can be
used in conjunction with annual carbon emission limits to meet
California's economy-wide goal of reducing emissions. To assist CARB
in fulfilling its charge, the state created the Market Advisory Committee
(hereinafter "MAC") to advise CARB on the development of a statewide
plan to reduce GHG emissions. MAC is comprised of national and
international experts in environmental policy, regulatory affairs,
economics, and energy technologies. 84 MAC's primary objective was to
design a mandatory cap-and-trade program to achieve cost-effective
emissions cuts across all sectors.8 5 MAC employed a systems approach
and examined how a cap-and-trade program might interact with other
measures such as regulations, performance-based standards, price
subsidies, and tax credits. 86 In its Final Report, issued in 2007, MAC
concluded that a cap-and-trade program is fully compatible with other
regulatory programs being introduced in the state and that such a marketbased system could contribute significantly to meeting the emissions
target in AB 32.

MAC's Final Report included several key recommendations. First,
the California cap-and-trade program should eventually incorporate all

83 Cal.

Air Res. Bd., AB 32 Fact Sheet - California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006 (Sept. 25, 2006), availableat
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ab32factsheet.pdf.
8 Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Expert Advisors Release Final Cap-and-Trade
Report: Recommendations Intended to Complement California's Ongoing Efforts to
Reduce Emissions (June 29, 2007), availableat
http://www.calepa.ca.gov/PressRoom/Releases/2007/PR12-062907.pdf.
MKT. ADvISORY COMM. To THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING
A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA, at iii (2007), available

at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007 publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007007.PDF.
86

d.

87

,-
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major GHG-emitting sectors in the state. The greatest attention should
be given to the electricity, industry, building, and transportation sectors as
these are the main contributors of emissions. 89 The program's scope,
however, should be expanded over time so that it covers as many sectors,
sources, and gases as possible to enable the state to meet its overall
emissions reduction goal. To that end, MAC recommends that CARB
adopt mandatory reporting requirements for all sources likely to be subject
to a GHG emissions cap.
Second, the cap-and-trade program should use a combined
approach with regard to the distribution of allowances.
MAC
recommended the initial scheme of freely allocating some shares of
allowances and auctioning the other shares of allowances.91
The
percentage of allowances auctioned off should increase over time. 92 MAC
encourages the state to retain flexibility to freely allocate some of the
allowances in a manner that stabilizes the price impacts and manages
competitiveness among California power producers. 93 Free allocation of
allowances should be determined by environmental performance standards
and the auction should be designed to promote voluntary early
reductions. 94
Third, because the quantity of California's imported electricity
generated from coal is significant, California's cap-and-trade program
should take a "first-seller approach" to capping emissions associated with
electricity. Under this approach, the entity that first sells electricity within
the state must meet the compliance obligation established under the capand-trade scheme.95 For power generated in California, the owner or
operator of the in-state power plant is considered the first seller and would
be required to meet the emissions cap. 96 For imported power, the first
88

Id. at iv. "In general, CARB should seek to expand the cap-and-trade program over
time so that it covers as many sectors, sources, and gases as practicable." Id. at 38, 79.
89
Id..
90
Id. at 79.
9 Id. at iv.
92

d

93 Id. at v.
94 id
9Id. at iv.
96id
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seller is typically an investor-owned or municipal-owned utility or
wholesale power marketer that sells electricity to a load-serving entity or
large end-user. 97 The out-of-state entity under this approach would also be
required to meet the emissions cap. 98
This MAC's recommendations represent a significant departure
from the original scheme. Originally, AB 32 intended to regulate GHGs
from the utility sector by regulating all load-serving entities (hereinafter
"LSEs"), or retailers of power.99 Legally, all of these LSEs are located instate or at least doing business in-state.1oo It is clear that state regulatory
agencies have jurisdictional authority over retail power markets within its
state.' 0
The California carbon scheme covers all LSEs, including
municipal LSEs.102 Electric generators are required to meet a CO 2
emissions level no greater than that achievable by a combined-cycle gasfired generator.' 03 Any new contracts for a term of five years or more, for

97

Id

98Id

99 CAL. HEALTH
100See id.

& SAFETY CODE

§ 38530(a)(2) (West 2007).

101Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) (citing
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)).
102 See Seth Hilton, The Impact of California'sGlobal Warming
Legislation on the

Electric Utility Industry, 19 ELEC. J., Nov. 2006, at 10, 12. California is home to the
largest municipal utility in the nation, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP), serving a multi-million person consumer base. LADWP: Our Service
History, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwpOO0508.jsp (last visited July 18, 2009).
LADWP is among the most dependent California LSE's on both power imports from out
of state, and coal-fired high-GHG power. Hilton, supra note 102, at 13.
103 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)(1) (West 2007). This legislation targets only electric
generation, governs all new long-term energy commitments and establishes a
"greenhouse gas emissions performance standard." Id. § 8341(a). This is specific to the
electric power role in meeting AB 32 goals. The GHG emissions standard creates a
specific level of permissible emissions and prohibits new construction, new long-term
power contracts, and any major plant investment that will not meet the performance
standard. See id. This prohibits load-serving entities from entering long-term power
contracts with out-of-state producers who do not meet California's stringent new
emissions standard. See id. California's Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has set the

672

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 3

the procurement of baseload generation, must comply with a performance
standard of emitting no more than 1100 lbs C0 2/MWh of power
generation."
nBaseload" generation is defined as generation that is
designed and intended to operate at an annualized capacity factor of sixty
percent or greater.105
Roughly one-half of California's electric sector GHG emissions are
the result of electric power imports from out-of-state that stem
predominately from coal-fired power plants. 06 The impact of California's
new emissions limitations will thus significantly restrict the attractiveness
of coal-fired generation for California. While California has little in-state
coal generation, various California LSEs, particularly the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, import significant coal-fired power from
various other states.107 This legislation will have a significant impact on
such LSEs.
D. Regional U.S. Carbon Cap-and-Trade
The WCI is a regional cap-and-trade effort to address climate
change in Oregon, Washington, California, Arizona, New Mexico,

GHG emissions performance standard at the equivalent of the emissions from a
combined-cycle natural gas plant. Id. § 8341(d)(1).
104 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, §§ 2901(d)(2), 2902(a) (2009). This is a level that
conventional coal-fired electric generation will not be able to meet because even
gasification combined-cycle technology generates about 1770 lbs. C0 2/MWh. Hilton,
supra note 102, at 14.
105 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(a).
106See Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies,
Rulemaking Proceeding 06-04-009, Decision 07-09-017, 2007 WL 2579525, at *3 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n. Sept. 6, 2007). Three-quarters of California's power imports come
from the Southwest, and involves much coal-fired power, as opposed to the other quarter
that is imported through the Northwest. AL ALVARADO & KAREN GRIFFIN, CAL. ENERGY
COMM'N., REVISED METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE GENERATION RESOURCE MIX OF
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY IMPORTS: UPDATE TO THE MAY 2006 STAFF PAPER 1, 3 (2007),

available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-700-2007-007/CEC-7002007007. PDF.
107See Hilton, supra note 102, at 13. The three major investor-owned utilities import
three to fifteen percent of their total supply in the form of out-of-state coal-fired power.
Id. The Los Angeles DPW imports half of its power from these sources. Id.
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Montana, and Utah, as well as the provinces of British Columbia,
Manitoba, Quebec, and Ontario. 0 8 In August 2007, WCI announced the
establishment of its regional, economy-wide goal to reduce GHG
emissions to fifteen percent below 2005 levels by 2020.109 To help reach
this goal, WCI member states and provinces have committed to a multisector market-based mechanism."o The regulated emissions are from
across all sectors and include the six GHGs reported to the UNFCCC."'
Half of the WCI states have not been able to approve the necessary state
legislation.l 12
Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited Aug.
2, 2009). Governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington
signed the original agreement in February 2007. Energy Information Administration,
State Regulations on Airborne Emissions: Update Through 2007,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/aeo_2008analysispapers/sraemissions.html
(last visited July 26, 2009). In May 2007, the state of Utah and the Canadian provinces
of British Columbia and Manitoba joined WCI. Id. The states of Alaska, Kansas,
Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho and Nevada, the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and
Nova Scotia, and six Mexican states, Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas will participate in WCI as observers. Id.
109 Press Release, W. Climate Initiative, Western Climate Initiative Members Set
Regional Target to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Aug. 22, 2007); see also
Regional Initiatives, http://www.
pewclimate.org/what s beingdone/inthe_states/regionalinitiatives.cfm?preview-1
(describing various regional climate change agreements among the states, including the
Western Climate Initiative).
110 Press Release, W. Climate Initiative, supra note 109; Cathy Cash, Western Region
Plan to Reduce GHG Emissions has Energy Suppliers Waitingfor Specifics, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., Aug. 27, 2007, at 20.
111Compare W. Climate Initiative, Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Capand-Trade Program 1 (2008) with Kyoto Protocol, supranote 9, annex A (these six
GHG's include: carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N20),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6 )).
112 See John Fleck, Officials Forge Ahead on Emissions, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Mar. 30,
2009, at A6, availableat
http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/metro/301125460740newsmetroO3-30-09.htm ("The
difficulty in passing legislation here is mirrored in other states. Efforts in Montana,
Arizona, Utah and Washington, which are also part of the Western Climate Initiative,
have run into delays, raising questions about the necessity of state-by-state efforts to get
legislation passed."); Tom Banse, Economy Thwarts Regional Cap-and-TradePlan on
108
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In developing its market approach, WCI members are engaging in
discussions with leaders in the RGGI and may consider some variety of
incentives, standards, and regulations similar to the approach California
has taken to combat climate change." 3 The Western state WCI program
will allow participating states to use CDM and JI Kyoto credits as
offsets.114 Environmental groups have complained about the out-of-region
geographic location of such offsets." 5 California is the lead state in
forming WCI, but now complains that it is not treated fairly in the
emerging WCI legal construct. California complained that the WCI will
impose an inordinate burden on the California power sector starting in
2012, by excluding restriction on the transportation sector until 2015."
Shifting to the center of the nation, in November 2007, six
participating Midwestern states and Manitoba, a Canadian province,
executed a regional greenhouse gas emission reduction strategy.' 7 This
included Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio,
South Dakota, Wisconsin, Manitoba, and Ontario."
Three of these
eleven states and provinces are observing, rather than participating
Climate, OPB NEWS, April 3, 2009,
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/301125460740newsmetro03-30-09.htm ("Utah
and Arizona legislators went so far as to urge their governors to pull out of the Western
climate group. In the New Mexico and Montana legislatures, the idea never saw the light
of day. In Washington State, lawmakers considered and then quickly dropped the cap. In
Oregon, the process of watering down the greenhouse gas rules underway.").
113See August WCI Update, westernclimateinitiative.org/news-and-updates/67-Augustwci-update (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) ("WCI Partner jurisdictions have initiated
discussions with the other two regional programs in North America: the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord. The three regions are proposing to collaborate in key areas, which will expand
the footprint of each of the regional program designs, particularly in the area of offsets.").
114 Western GHG TradingPlanDraws Concerns Over Offsets, Auctions,
CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, July 28, 2008.
11s id.
1" California Utilities Cry Foul Over Western State Cap-and-TradePlan, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 22, 2008, at 4.
117 See Midwestern Governor's Ass'n, Midwestern Energy Sec. &
Climate Stewardship
Summit, Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (Nov. 15, 2007), availableat
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/Publications/Greenhouse%20gas%20accordLayo

ut%201.pdf.
118 id.
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initially."l 9 The group worked to develop a cap-and-trade carbon program
for implementation in 2010, and without specific targets will attempt to
cut emissions by 2020.120
This region depends heavily on coal-fired electric generation, and
is, therefore, distinct technologically from both California and the RGGI
states. Recommendations would allow twenty percent of reductions to be
achieved through use of offsets.'21 There is dispute as to whether
allowances can come from other states.122
The RGGI, Western states,' and Midwest states' carbon regulation
schemes collectively include about half of the U.S. states plus Canadian
providences. RGGI only affects CO 2 from larger power plants, while the
regional climate initiatives are looking at GHGs more broadly from
various economic sectors.
III. STAKEHOLDER DISPUTES INSIDE THE EU AND THE U.S.

There are a handful of recent major serious disputes within the EU:
Whether allowances to emit CO 2 will be auctioned to
industry beginning in 2013, or freely allocated to industry;
Conflict between original and later-joining states;
The means of future application to coal-fired electric power
production;
Whether states are willing to concede decision-making to a
central EU; and
The speed and base of program requirements.
A. Auction ofAllowances to Emit

20

' See ADVISORY GROUP, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, DRAFT
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY GROUP § 1.1.1, at 3 (2009), availableat

http://www.midwestem accord.org/AccordDraft Final.pdf.
121
Id. § 4.5, at 23.
122 See id. § 3.5,
at 12.
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Auction of allowances has emerged as a key conflict. If the
auction of allowances idea is adopted, it will have profound wealthshifting implications. The EU-ETS program was originally committed to
free allocation of allowances to regulated industrial emitters. 1 23 Even
though in Phase I (2005-2007) up to five percent of carbon emissions
allowances were allowed to be auctioned by an EU country, only four of
the twenty-seven nations employed any auction (Denmark, Ireland,
Hungary, and Lithuania), 124 and then in total auctioned only 0.13% of total
allowances.125 During the current 2008-2012 phase, it is expected that
eight Western European nations will auction about three percent of EUETS allowances.126 Auction of CO 2 allowances to all power generators
has been proposed by the European Commission to commence in 2013,
phased to 100% auction by 2020.127 There also is an effort for post-2012
centralization of allocation of EU emissions rights, eliminating the
controversial past practice of national allocation. 128
Poland and other Eastern EU nations have resisted immediate
auction of allowances.129 Both assert that its industries are more energyintensive than in Western EU nations, and, thus, would be competitively
disadvantaged by allowance auctions; France and Luxembourg join this
concern. 130 Italian leaders resisted EU auction of allowances as "not
suitable, ... untenable" and "an act of madness."l31 Political concessions
were made in Poznan, Poland, meetings, in December 2008, where the
former Eastern-Block EU states were given twelve percent of future
123
124

Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 5, arts. 9-11.
Judit Zegndl, Lithuanian EmissionsAuction Success Expected,
BUDAPEST

Bus. J.,

Sept. 3, 2007, availableat
http://www.euets.com/index.php?page=news&newsid=62&1=1.

CONVERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL. L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM INPERSPECTIVE 38 tbl.4 (2008).
125

26
1

127

Stephen Gardner, EU Parliament,Council Making Progress on Post-2012 Emissions

Trading
Scheme, 39
128

d

ENv'T REP.

(BNA) 1417 (2008).

Leigh Phillips, Emissions PermitAuctioning Key Concern ofEastern Europe,
EUOBSERVER, Mar. 4,2008, http://euobserver.com/9/25767.
129

Renata Goldirova, Rocky Path ahead for EU Green Legislation, EUOBSERVER, Oct.
21, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26965.
1'
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auction revenues from allowance auction, in order to subsidize
continuation of certain high-carbon industries.' 32
In the U.S., there also has been a divergence on auctions. In the
first U.S. carbon program, RGGI, commencing January 2009, the Guiding
Principles Agreement provided: "[t]he initial phase of the cap-andtrade program will entail the allocation and trading of carbon dioxide
allowances to and by sources in the power sector only."' 33 However, most
states have since switched to an auction of allowances to essentially any
bidder, not an allocation to affected facilities as contemplated in the
Guiding Principles Agreement. This will transfer income among states.
The 2008 financial meltdown has increased pressure to raise
revenues through auction rather than traditional allocation of allowances
without charge.134 That pressure is felt both in the EU and the U.S.
environmental groups which has resulted in those groups seeking auction
of all allowances to raise revenues.1 35 Environmental non-governmental
organizations (hereinafter "NGOs") are similarly active in both the EU
and U.S. Criticism of the WCI efforts regarding whether allowances will
be auctioned has occurred.136
Sempra Energy Utilities, the electric and gas distribution utility in
the greater San Diego area, questioned the legality of auctioning
allowances if the revenues therefrom were returned to the state general
fund.137 The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("LADWP"),
1 Pete Harrison & Huw Jones, EU Finalizes Deal to Fight Climate Change, Dec. 17,
2008, http://www.enn.com/climate/article/38880.

133REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, SHORT-TERM ACTION

ITEMS 1 (2003), availableat http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfmal.pdf.
134 Doug Obey, Wall Street Bailouts May Intensfy Focus on Carbon Trading Revenues,
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 19, 2008, at 1.

1s Environmentalists Urge Western States to Auction GHG Allowances, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008.
131

Western Climate Officials CreateNew Panels to Tackle Tough Policies,CARBON

CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008.

1 See Letter from Bernie Orozco, Dir., State Gov't Affairs, Sempra Energy, to Dr. Alan
Lloyd, Chair, Cal. Envtl. Protection Agency (Jan. 30, 2006), availableat
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/publications/cat/comments/Sempra%20Energy%20Jan
uary%2030,%202006.pdf; Letter from Michael Murray, Reg'1 Vice President, State
Gov't Affairs, Sempra Energy et al., to Kevin Kennedy, Chief, Office of Climate Change,
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the largest municipal utility in the U.S., recently threatened legal suit over
the California proposal to auction carbon emission allowances, alleging
that it would result in a one billion per year transfer from legacy coal
utilities in the Southern part of the state to Northern legacy non-coal
utilities and its ratepayer in the North.' 3 8 LADWP also charged that
auction of allowances was an illegal tax and violated the state
Constitution. 139 The coal industry, power, and railroad industries have
threatened some states with suit over the RGGI auction program in the
Eastern U.S.1 4 0 Auctioning state allowances becomes even more
contentious in the U.S., as it raises issues of possible unconstitutionality of
the "bright line" between federal and state energy regulatory authority,
depending on its implementation, within the U.S. legal system.
B. Conflict with New Entrants and Relative Degree ofDevelopment
The carbon tensions between nations in the EU mirror each
nation's degree of development and economic self-interest,
notwithstanding that the impact of each molecule of CO 2 has identical
global impact. Europe is the first regional carbon trading area of the
world, and contains thirty-four of the thirty-nine Kyoto-regulated Annex I
carbon nations. The five other Kyoto carbon-regulated countries have no
common borders with other countries (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand)
or border only with non-participating countries (Canada and Turkey).
The twenty-seven EU nations increasingly are more acrimoniously
divided on carbon policy between the EU-15, more affluent original
Western European EU member states, and the more recent less affluent
former Soviet Block Eastern European members, eight of whom joined the
EU in 2004 and two more in 2007. The EU-ETS carbon scheme,
originally commencing in 2005, covered the then-twenty-five EU

Cal. Air Res. Bd. (June 12, 2009), availableat
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/ 051809/mayl8pcpgescesempra.pdf.
138 Major Utility Argues Caifornia GHG Plan Illegal, Seeks Rehearing,
CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, at 2.
39

Id.

140 Curt

Barry, FirstRGGIAllowance Auction May Trigger Coal Industry Lawsuits,

CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 16, 2008, at 1.
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countries. With the addition of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, this raised
the number of EU members to twenty-seven, with all required to
participate in CO 2 reduction through the EU-ETS.141 Three non-EU
member countries, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, recently joined the
EU-ETS carbon system.14
Romania and Bulgaria demanded larger CO 2 emission allocations
than were given to each by the European Commission, and thereafter
judicially appealed this allocation to the European Court of First
Instance.143 During Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005-2007), the Eastern
Block countries received an allocation surplus of free allowances based on
a 1990 baseline pre-Soviet-restructurinf, which allowed its industries to
sell surplus free allowances for profits.
In the current Phase 11 (20082012), these countries have had their CO 2 allocations slashed.145
However, post 2012, the EU proposal, reflecting accession to political
pressure to achieve consensus, now is to allow central and eastern EU

countries to increase emissions up to twenty-percent above 2005 levels,
rather than reduce carbon.14 6
These eight Eastern European countries, joined by Italy and
Greece, are the ten countries leading the revolt inside the EU-ETS.
Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia launched legal actions against
the EU Commission, asserting that even their relatively modest future
carbon limits are too strict for the countries' economic growth.147 These

141

CONVERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 22.

142 d
14 3 id.
1

EU ETS Turns Sourfor Polandand Other NeighboringEasternEuropean Countries,
REDORBIT, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/1 551325/euetsturns_sour for poland andoth
er neig hboringeastem/index.htm.
14

d.

146 See Renata Goldirova, Brussels to Unveil EU Green Strategy Amid Strong
Criticism,

EUOBSERVER, Jan. 21, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/25493.
147 Erica Herrero-Martinez, States Study Carbon Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at
B5A.

680

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 16, No. 3
four countries, along with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, form a
block of eight countries which want more concessions on future carbon. 14 8
These eight countries, joined by Greece, representing one-third of
the EU members, have voting power together to block or stall EU carbon
control action. The EU process requires at least ninety-one votes of the
345 in the European Council to block further actions,149 just as forty
percent of U.S. Senators can block action on carbon legislation. Prime
Minister Ivars Godmanis of Latvia stated that he would veto any climate
package unless it contained more concessions for the Eastern countries
that joined the EU in 2004.50 "Poland is ready to veto. . . ," stated Poland
Foreign Minister Radek Sikorksi.'' Czech President Klaus, has publicly
questioned whether there is such a thing as human-made climate
change.152 Less developed areas have resisted consensus.
There is some precedent for phasing in the compliance obligation
of developing countries with international environmental requirements.
The Montreal Protocol included trade sanctions for enforcement, giving
developing countries a ten-year grace period.153 Some countries are now
discussing trade sanctions as a mechanism to force reluctant countries to
adopt requirements.' 54 However, tariff sanctions could run afoul of WTO
requirements against trade barriers concerning renewable energy sources.
148Siobahn Hall, Tough Negotiations on EU ClimatePackage,ENERGY ECONOMIST,
Nov. 1, 2008, at 33.
149 Derek Scally, PolandSays it has Gathered
Enough Support to Stall EU Carbon

Emission Controls, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at 11, available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2008/1004/1222 959350204.html.
Iso Stephen Castle, European Nations, FearingDownturn, Seek to Revise Agreement on
Emissions Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/world/europe/17union. html.
"' Leigh Phillips, Italy, PolandThreaten to Veto EU Climate Package, EUOBSERVER,
Oct. 16, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26945.
152 David Charter, EU's New FigureheadBelieves Climate Change is a Myth, TIMES
(London), Jan. 2, 2009, availableat
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5430362.ece.
153 Montreal Protocol, supra note 29, art. 5.
154 See generally LEESTEFFY JENKINS, Trade Sanctions:Effective Enforcement Tools, in
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 221, 221-228
(James Cameron et al. eds., 1996) (analyzing precedent for using trade sanctions as a
legitimate means of achieving international environmental objectives).
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Article XX of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter
"GATT") provides health and environmental exceptions that can be
pursued outside national territory if aimed at a conservation or protection
goal.15 5 Even the Kyoto Protocol states that its mechanisms should not
imperil international trade.15 6
The LADWP continues to fight the California cap-and-trade
proposal as a "wealth transfer" between utility ratepayers in different parts
of the state, and distrusts that auction funds once in the hands of state
legislators would be returned to utility ratepayers.' 57 The early twentythree states regulating carbon at the state level in the U.S. are generally
more liberal politically, than the states that have not so committed, and
will resist future regulation. Those states that will be last to embrace
carbon regulation in the U.S. have a tremendous ability, if the states resist,
to be the "leakage" in the system. The results of modeling commissioned
by the RGGI Staff Working Group found that a substantial proportion of
CO 2 emissions avoided by RGGI will be offset by corresponding increases
in non-RGGI states, such as Pennsylvania.1 5 8
C. Regions ofEmbedded High-Carbon Coal-PoweredGeneration
This Eastern European EU Block joined by Greece and Italy fear
power sector uncompetitiveness or "leakage" of other power into its
economies vis-At-vis larger utilities in France and Germany.1 59 To reduce

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
156 Kyoto Protocol, supra note
9, art. 2(3).
157 Major Utility Argues California GHG PlanIllegal, Seeks Rehearing,
supra note 138.
See RGGI EMIssIONS MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, REG'L GREENHOUSE
1ss

GAS INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS, AND
POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS 8-11 (2007), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/il-report-final3_14_07.pdf.
159 Scally, supra note 149; Phillips, supra note 151; Michael Levitin, PolandLeads

Revolt againstEU Climate Change Deal,LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 4, 2008, at
19, availableat http://www. telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/3352775/EU-climatechange-cuts-Poland-leads-revolt-over-Russia-fears.html.
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annual carbon emissions, if EU countries are forced to shift from coal to
less carbon-intensive natural gas-fired power generation, it would make
EU countries more dependent on natural gas imported from Russia: "[w]e
are dependent on Russia for ninety-seven percent of our gas and more than
ninety percent of our petrol." 60 Not forgotten, was Russia's quick strike
into neighboring Georgia in August 2008, and its termination of gas
supplies to the Ukraine in January 2006 and again in 2009, which greatly
diminished gas supplies throughout the EU.
"Fifty-eight percent of the world's gas is owned by Russia, Iran,
and Qatar. "Coal is on every continent," notes coal executive Richard
Budge.161 Poland generates ninety-five percent of its power production
from coal, which will require more auctioned CO 2 allowances than other
fossil fuels, and could increase Poland's electric power prices by up to an
estimated ninety percent.162 This resistance resulted in recent EU
fracturous concessions to the most coal-burning nations in order to hold
the EU-ETS together. At the Poznan, Poland, and Kyoto Protocol carbon
meetings in December 2008, EU nations tentatively agreed to extend the
allocation of free carbon emission allowances to utilities equal to the
needs of an efficient coal-burning power plant and double time by
extending compliance dates to 2020.163 This threatens even the modest

Levitin, supranote 159.
Landler, ForEurope, a Green Self-Image Clashes with a Reliance on Coal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at Al, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20eurocoal.html.
160

161Mark

162 Hall, supranote 148.
163 See CMS CAMERON MCKENNA LLP, PHASE III OF THE EU EMIssIONS
TRADING

SCHEME 8-9 (2009), available at http://www.lawnow.com/cmck/pdfs/nonsecured/phase3.pdf ("New EU member states may temporarily
derogate from the full auctioning rule applicable to the power sector and receive a
proportion of their allowances free of charge if: in 2007, the electricity network of a
particular Member State was not interconnected with the EU system; or in 2007, the
electricity network was connected to the EU system through a single line with a capacity
of less than 400MW; or in 2006, more than 30% of electricity of a particular Member
State was produced from a single fossil fuel and the GDP per capita in relation to the EU
average did not exceed 50% of the average GDP per capita of the EU."). The auctioning
for such member states will be a minimum thirty percent, increasing to 100% in 2020.
Climate Action Network Europe: Energy and Climate Policy in Europe,
www.climnet.org/EUenergy/EUEnergyPackageOutcome.html (last accessed Sept. 23,
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goals of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU-ETS and contrasts with the recent
call by some members of the scientific community for radical reductions
in CO 2 emissions before a "tipping point" in global climate.'6
Similar divisions to those in the EU are discernible in some of the
states in the U.S. considering carbon regulation. The areas of the U.S.
most reliant on coal power are not the leaders in the U.S. on carbon
regulation. Disputes have already erupted between California and the
other six WCI member states, still years before program commencement,
over whether the nature of the cap is too restrictive to the California power
industry, which is the first industry sector targeted.165 The Midwestern
state carbon program has stalled amid dissent involving coal-dependent
states.166
Similarly, U.S. states that have lower median incomes are not
generally the leaders on carbon regulation. The President of Duke Energy
worries that federal carbon regulation will be "California-centric" and
"ideologically driven." 67 He claims that California imports a lot of coalfired and hydroelectric power, has the highest U.S. disposable income, and
that California has high levels of electric consumption.168
The coal industry has threatened suit against RGGI as being an
unauthorized tax or otherwise illegal.169 A New York RGGI official
commented that there is a substantial chance of litigation challenge in
New York, Maryland, and Massachusetts.1 70 This prophecy was realized
in 2009, when the RGGI carbon regulatory program was challenged in
2009). "One of the costs of avoiding 100%free allocation in the [Central and Eastern
European] power sector, is a provision on state aid that allows for fifteen percent of the
costs of new coal power plants ([Carbon Capture and Storage]-ready) between 2013 and
2016 to be met using auction revenues." Id.
I Hansen, supra note 3; McKibben, supra note 3.
165See California Utilities Cry Foul Over Western State Cap-and-TradePlan,supra note
116.
166 Cf supranote 112 (regarding hesitancy of more than half of the WCI western states to
adopt implanting legislation, now two years into their consideration).
167 Jeff Ryser, Duke's Rogers Fears C02 Legislationwill be 'California-centric'and
Driven by Ideology, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 16, 2009, at 22.
168
69
170

Id.

Barry, supra note 140.
id.
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New York by an owner of an independent power generator who was
subject to that regulation.' 7 ' This generation asset owner challenged the
RGGI scheme as an improperly authorized state program in violation of
the state's constitution, as well as a violation of the Compact Clause of the

U.S. Constitution.172

D. CentralizedVersus DecentralizedCarbon Control
There is movement to centralize Brussels EU allocation of carbon
reduction targets rather than continue state control. The current EU
carbon regime represents as much political expediency as an objective
application of neutral scientific principles. The twenty-seven participating
Annex I EU countries made significant differentiation among its
responsibilities to reduce carbon emissions. This ranges from a twentyeight percent carbon reduction in countries like Luxembourg, to an
allowed twenty-seven percent carbon increasein Portugal.17 3
Consequently, five of the more developed EU-ETS countries (UK,
Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Austria) were short of allowances, while several
eastern European EU members were over-allocated allowances, which
caused them to trade allowances to power industries in Western EU
countries, earning the allowance sellers approximately 6700 million.174
The power industry was the sector which shouldered that shortage, while
other industries in the country were protected in national allocations. 7 5
This was because the often monopolized power sector did not face
international competition in most EU countries, and thus did not face
"leakage" of market share from supply outside the state.
Because of inconsistencies and controversies in individual
countries, the plan for post-2012 is centralized EU allocation of carbon
emissions rights, eliminating current national allocation.' 7 6 Yet, some of
171 Indeck

Corinth v. Paterson, No. 2009369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29,
2009).
Verified Joint Petition and Complaint, Indeck, No.
2009369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29,
2009).
172

1 HOBLEY, supranote 32, at 129.
174 CONVERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
171 Id. at 11.

176 Gardner, supra note
127.
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the Eastern European countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary)
are expected to challenge its future allocations. Central and Eastern EU
states have launched legal proceedings against the European Commission,
each alleging its allocations are already too low.' 7 7
These issues parallel similar concerns in the U.S.
To get
consensus for RGGI, New York gave away some of its carbon allocation
to other states. In RGGI, a deregulated power sector shoulders the entire
carbon reduction burden. There are disputes over whether the twentythree states starting to regulate carbon will concede authority willingly to
federal control or whether it will be accepted.' 7 8 There is vigorous dispute
in the U.S. Congress over whether to "grandfather" existing state carbon
regulation, or centralize a single national system.179
A similar conflict is already visible at the regional level. The state
of California has complained that the WCI will impose an inordinate
burden on the California power sector by excluding the transportation
sector until 2015. so Because California utilities rely on out-of-state
electricity imports, California utilities argue that it requires extra
allocation of any allowances from other states. Such conflicts already are
dividing stakeholders within states.
Terry Tamminen, an energy
advisor to California Governor Schwarzenegger, characterized the
LADWP position against California's planned 2012 carbon control as
"morally bankrupt . . . it is time for those utilities [that] have put

themselves in this position to step up and internalize the cost that they
have been foisting on the rest of us for decades . . . so that people in Los

Angeles can have cheap electricity."' 82 Tamminen stated that potential
legal challenges could pose the biggest stumbling block to California's
climate change initiatives.' 83
HOBLEY, supra note 32, at 135.
' Statesfor Preemption?,CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Mar. 31, 2008.
79 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 861 (2009).
180 CalforniaUtilities Cry Foul Over Western State Cap-and-Trade
Plan, supra note
116.
1n
78

181 Id.

Lisa Weinzimer, SchwarzeneggerAdvisor Says States, Regions will Take Lead on
Climate Programs,ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 16, 2008, at 7.
182
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E. The Pace of Carbon Control
At issue is whether the original EU and Kyoto Protocol 1990
carbon emission baselines (prior to Soviet collapse) or the recently
proposed 2005 carbon baselines (reflecting lower Eastern EU CO 2 levels)
will be the baseline against which carbon compliance will be measured.
Poland and Bulgaria argue that more advanced Western EU countries
should do more carbon reduction, while the poorer Eastern European
countries should do less.184 Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, noted
that no global warming-related actions should result in an increase in the
price of energy, especially during times of economic downturn.' 85 Italian
Prime Minister Berlusconi called for less expensive carbon regulation in
tough economic times: "I am ready to use our veto powers. Our
companies are in no state to take on costs like those we thought about last
year."l86 He stated that the proposed EU-ETS carbon reduction targets for
2020 would crucify Italian industry. 8 7
The debate in the U.S. follows similar lines. First, national carbon
legislation was held up in the U.S. Congress in 2008 regarding
technological and policy compromises, and forty-percent of U.S. Senate
members can do so indefinitely if consensus is not achieved. During a
period of economic downturn, similar questions are emerging as to how
aggressive U.S. carbon control can be.
California Governor
Schwarzenegger, one of the earliest and most stalwart proponents for

184

Castle, supra note 150.

185Renata

Goldirova, Poland Gears Upfor Battle over C02 Emissions, EUOBSERVER,
Oct.
9,
2008,
http://euobserver.com/9/26901.
186
Joe Murphy, Cost Row Threatens EU Climate Strategy, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2008, at 2, availableat
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23573744details/Cost+row+threatens+EU+ climate+strategy/article.do; see also Hall, supra note
148.
187 David Charter & Rory Watson, Black Clouds Hang over Green Targets as EU States
Say we Can'tAfford Them, TIMEs (London), Oct. 17, 2008, at 6.

687

PAST IS PROLOGUE
carbon regulation, moved in early 2009 to ease green power regulations
because of California's economic downturn.' 8 8
IV. How EU PAST IS U.S. PROLOGUE

Not everything European becomes an aspect of U.S. reality.
However, with carbon regulation, there is noticeable parallel carryover
from issues confronting the "older" continent to the "new." This is
because carbon regulation is a function of both regulation and technology,
with which there is substantial overlap in modern Western industrial
countries on each side of the Atlantic. There also is deliberate
synchronization: New U.S. Energy Secretary, Steven Chu, has announced
that he and President Obama support a simple cap-and-trade system for
the U.S., which would "integrate" with the systems in the EU.1 89
The economic crisis is causing developing areas to second-guess
the rate of required regional GHG reduction. There is a policy split based
on the degree of regional reliance on coal generation as the power source
for the economy and development. The EU and U.S. areas most reliant on
coal power are most resistant to aggressive cap-and-trade carbon
regulation and allowance auction.
Suits have been threatened against both RGGI states and in
California regarding these disputes in the form of carbon regulation. In
California, disputes have pitted investor-owned utilities against the
nation's largest municipal utility, which threatens suit over its alleged
inequity against coal-dependent regions. In the ten RGGI states, suit is
threatened over auction of allowances designed to raise the cost of coalproduced wholesale power, as well as against efforts to stop the interstate
flow of outside-region high-carbon power into the RGGI region.
Allegations of the Constitution Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause
violations are also at play.
The EU-ETS embodies eighty-five percent of world countries now
regulating carbon emissions. The pattern of recently escalating EU
dispute and spirited policy dissent is prologue. Given technological and
188 Lisa Weinzimer, SchwarzeneggerPressesfor Easing Green Regulations to Head Off
FinancialCrisis, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 12, 2009, at 15.
1 New DOE Secretary Backs Cap-and-Trade,supra note 4.

688

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 3
policy similarities, the recent EU carbon disagreements foreshadow
upcoming U.S. disputes and debate. In times of economic collapse, there
is worldwide pressure for the carbon regulatory system to morph into a
revenue raising scheme through auction of allowances. These issues are
fundamental to the scope, speed, and effectiveness of GHG reduction
policy before the world passes any "tipping point" of diminishing
scientific effectiveness. Past is prologue: these recent EU disputes
foreshadow the evolution of the U.S. debate.
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